REPRESENTATIVES from London and Brussels will meet next Monday for Starmer’s Brexit Reset summit. Astonishingly there has been next to no coverage in the mainstream press of the most fundamental aspect of Starmer’s betrayal – his big defence (by definition sovereignty) sell-out of the 17.4million pro-Brexit votes being planned.
The Telegraph has commented on a ‘leaked draft of a new security partnership [that] commits the UK to consider sending its Armed Forces abroad on EU military missions’ which would ‘effectively lock Britain’s decision-making powers in Nato, the G7, the G20 and the United Nations to the EU in an aligned foreign policy, severely limiting the UK’s room for independence’. But takes this no further.
Yet the European Council publicly lists defence and security as their leading priority for this ‘long-awaited gathering’ at which ‘the UK and EU are hoping to sign a security pact’. Politico reports that the two parties ‘are expected to reaffirm their commitment to working together on strategic and geopolitical issues and enhancing co-operation on foreign and security policy’.
The Telegraph this week dressed up the defence and security pact as an apparent positive for the UK: ‘In recent months’, the report reads, ‘the UK has been negotiating a defence and security pact with Brussels which would give Britain access to a European defence fund set up in response to Donald Trump’s apparent reluctance to guarantee the continent’s security.’
This however is far from the happy case, as the final part of Veterans for Britain’s (VfB) evidence, first presented to the Lords Reset committee in April, shows. It is a carbon copy of Theresa May’s dreadful WA deal, reported in the first three parts of this series, here, here and here, and worse.
Unlike the dilatory mainstream media, the VfB briefing points to the significant EU defence and security developments that have taken place since 2017 which would have profound and negative implications for the UK once tied into the new pact. Not least for the future of our defence industry.
This section of the VfB briefing paper is the focus today. VfB draw attention to a recently released ‘white paper’ on defence industrial co-operation by the European Commissioner for Defence and Space, Andrius Kubilius, which concerningly appears to incorporate Ukraine. While they acknowledge there would be advantages in defence industrial co-operation as a consequence of their experience with, for example, drones and long-range missiles, VfB warn that ‘incorporating a nation embroiled in a war must be seen as a premature move’.
EU defence industry cooperation has serious implications for the UK’s defence industry which is estimated to contribute more than £38billion to the economy overall, employing 147,000 people and another 110,000 in secondary areas – all huge numbers. A precis of VfB’s concerns follow:
- Sir Keir Starmer’s push for the British defence industry to be classified as ‘European’ to enable access to the market would also tie Britain more closely into the EU’s structures. Some EU countries – Poland, the Netherlands and the Baltics – have signalled support, though France is opposed, possibly, because EU countries buy almost 80 per cent of their equipment from outside the bloc.
- The proposals would make it all but impossible for EU members to buy defence equipment from the US, and also from Britain until and unless the UK joined the structures. This would be to the advantage of France, the world’s second-largest arms exporter, placing it in pole position to be the EU’s main arms supplier.
- Europe needs British expertise and experience in defence, and especially in research and development into next generation weapons. In spite of their rhetoric, the French know this and would like to tie the UK into the EU structures in a silent and subordinate role, causing the UK to lose decision-making autonomy over defence industrial policy, to their benefit as they see things.
- The EU ‘seeks to centralise control over defence industry, including the control of where those industries are located and what they manufacture’. This is clear from a number of sources. First, the EU Defence Action Plan promotes regional clusters or ‘centres of excellence’ which although under national governments, its EU financing can apply leverage on their location and what they produce. This is underpinned by the European Network of Defence Related Regions, launched in 2016.
- While the language in the EU’s white paper is opaque, the direction of travel is clear. There is, of course, duplication in defence industrial production across Europe. While that is clearly undesirable and a laudable object for rationalisation through co-operation, it should not be the excuse to seize control of national assets by the EU Commission.
- British sites could be closed and their output and jobs moved elsewhere. This would be bad for our economy, but far worse for our ability to manufacture the means of our own defence.
- The UK defence budget of around £220billion over four years without any increases other than for inflation is a significant amount. No wonder it is a target for the EU Commission to harness.
- Even given the considerable amount spent by the UK – which includes the nuclear deterrent, service pensions and defence diplomacy, which it did not during the Cold War – the effort needed to rebuild British armed forces is so great that the Chancellor’s claim that the UK can become a defence industrial superpower is not realisable, even with the co-operation and collaboration with allies that is essential. Nor can this ambition be attained if our defence industries are handed over to the control of the EU Commission.
- Comparative figures highlight the enormous overmatch of spending by the US of some $4trillion, and its vital significance to Nato and with it, to European defence.
- The US brings capabilities to Nato that no one else has, and no one else will ever afford. Capabilities that make Nato formidable and keep us safe.
- Recent US language hinting at a major withdrawal will encourage our enemies and, should it happen, would expose Europe to threats from Russia, among others. Governments should care deeply about this, and, while building co-operation and collaboration with European allies, use this to re-affirm our commitment to Nato by becoming once more credible and capable partners in the defence of Europe, as we were during the Cold War.
- This is the best way to demonstrate to the US that there are advantages in having allies and therefore, in continuing to invest in European defence. Merely handing over control of defence and defence industry to the EU will go nowhere towards building the sorts of capabilities that Nato, with US leadership, can provide. ‘We must, surely, take the long view, looking beyond the current difficulties with the US administration, to ensure that the solidity of the Nato alliance is enhanced and not undermined by the Pact.’
VfB emphasise that the UK may have to look at capabilities that currently only the US has – in air defence, drones, aviation, and long-range artillery, for example. That of course, means defence co-operation and collaboration, and agreed common procurement plans to cut costs. But this is not the same as handing over control of the UK’s national assets.
They end with a warning: ‘Elected politicians must be mindful that, unlike the EU Commission, they are accountable to their people. It is wrong therefore to allow what amounts to fundamental changes in the sovereignty of our country – in or out of the EU – without such changes being subject to Parliamentary scrutiny. The Referendum result underlines this requirement. Government must not be able to sign up to EU policies or laws unless they have been deposited in Parliament and until the committees of both Houses have completed their scrutiny work.
‘This is particularly urgent because 2025 is the year that the EU Commission and Council will enact their Strategic Compass and complete the EU Defence Union, ahead of the negotiations at the end of the year for the next EU Budget.
‘Nothing goes against the principle of developing, buying and selling defence materiel co-operatively to ensure better commonality between allies, or to ensure value for money. The UK’s defence industries can benefit from that, so long as the playing field is level.’
Nor, they emphasise, does their briefing paper suggest that the UK’s ships, troops and aircraft cannot take part in EU exercises or missions in the future – but they should do so on the same basis as we take part in Nato and UN missions. That is, as a sovereign nation that retains full command of its forces, delegating operational command or control for specific missions and tasks.
In conclusion, they assert that ‘the British Government has no legal, democratic or moral right to enter into any Pact that hands over control of our foreign policy, defence policy, or defence industry since to do so sacrifices our national sovereignty through the loss of control of the means of defence’.
They recommend that:
1. The Government ceases to pursue its ambition to re-subordinate the country to EU controls and stand on the principle that the first duty of government is the defence of the realm;
2. Defence co-operation and collaboration should be pursued in order to rebuild capabilities quickly and economically, but without legally binding commitments’, the example of Swiss participation in PESCO to be borne in mind;
3. UK defence industries should be safeguarded from relocation by the EU and that they should be able to compete in the world on a level playing field;
4. Finally, the UK’s most important commitment should be to Nato and that rebuilding defence in co-operation with European allies may be the best way to retain the confidence, and therefore the commitment, of American power in the defence of Europe.
Readers concerned about Labour’s big defence sell-out can sign this petition to ‘Hold a UK referendum before joining any defence and security pact with the EU’ here.
VfB’s fully referenced briefing paper, which details the questions they were required to respond to and contains the list of its signatories, can be referred to here.
